Munich, again: September 30, 1938 - Dilemmas of Diplomacy - James M. Lindsay
History Lessons: The Munich Agreement
by James M. Lindsay The Water's Edge, September 26, 2012
Share
13
1
A new installment of “History Lessons” is now out. This time I examine the signing of the Munich Agreement in the early morning hours of September 30, 1938. (The agreement itself is dated September 29, 1938.) In the video, I discuss the origins of the crisis over the Sudetenland, what British prime ministerNeville Chamberlain thought he was accomplishing in his negotiations with Adolf Hitler, and why the Munich Agreement did not bring “peace for our time.”
Watch the video on YouTube here.
The Munich Agreement has become a classic example of how not to conduct foreign policy, and it turned “appeasement” into a dirty word. But Munich also highlights a classic dilemma of diplomacy: accommodation can signal weakness and invite aggression, but standing firm can trigger conflicts otherwise avoided. Policymakers choose between these two risks at their peril because which of them is greater is clearer when looking backward in history than when looking forward into the future.
So here’s a question to consider when thinking about American foreign policy: on what issue or conflict is the United States most likely to repeat Neville Chamberlain’s mistake?
If you are interested in learning more about the Munich Agreement, here are some books worth reading:
Faber, David. Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (2009).
Goldstein, Erik and Igor Lukes (eds). The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II (1999).
Latynski, Maya (ed). Reappraising the Munich Pact: Continental Perspectives(1992).
Record, Jeffrey. The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler (2006).
Posted in Diplomacy, History LessonsShare
Post a Comment4 Comments
Posted by Carl F
There is a scene in The Godfather and its very striking with Clemenza & Michael. Clemenza says “you gotta stop them at the beginning. Like they should have stopped Hitler at Munich…. they was just asking for trouble”. The quote from Winston Churchill is absolutely stinging as well. I wonder if the same logic can be applied to the world situation today. Will we choose dishonor and still have war?
An avid Reader, Carl
Posted by MHP
Great piece. I don’t have an answer to your question, but a war with China seems like it would present a problem for the political leaders of that country: for instance, I believe that the leaders of the country maintain their power by allowing American money to flow into the country through their manufacturing sector — a war would mean shutting down funding from America.
The leaders (at least partially) derive power through the export mechanism, a war might disrupt that, therefore disrupting the power of the current political class. Just my two cents–
Posted by Arber Lloshi
By the question one understands that to make the same mistake USA has to make concessions to one of the two states, concession which shall bolder or strengthen that state in the point it shall directly oppose USA either in open war, or in any alike action/activity. To answer the question we should get back to history first: Chamberlain’s decision was a result of two main factors: First, UK was not willing to fight against Germany, but rather maintain a status quo of competing and antagonist states in mainland Europe, namely France, Germany and USSR. Since in the middle, Germany needed to be stronger to balance the power of the other historically enemies of Britain (in political, economical, historic, or ideological terms). And there was the belief that Germany would contain and oppose communism and protect West from the East. Second, UK was not prepared to fight an inland war with Germany. The population was not willing, neither the army was as strong. Also, economic benefits of a peaceful Europe must have had some rule. In the today globalized world, none of the two countries fulfills all of those characteristic: Iran is not in the position Germany was in terms of military and economic power compared to that of USA, but can be used as a tool of keeping the balances of Middle East in check (as long as it does not have nuclear armament and the present Syrian regime falls) and China is in almost the same, military, economic and political position as Germany was, but is cannot be used as a tool for keeping balances in east Asia, since it tends to disrupt it by gaining more power on itself. The social and economic factors play a bigger role in the case of China than that of Iran. for those reasons I believe that there is a bigger chance that USA refrains/limits itself more towards China than towards Iran. Although there is a bigger chance for China to act more aggressively against US interests after such a limitation than Iran, considering its economic, military, territorial and demographic might. Even though Iran tends to be more aggressive I don’t think it has any of the tools needed to directly oppose US, but is just trying to gain the leading role in the Middle East, strongly in question now. I’d think of Iran more as the Italy of WWII (was never going to fight UK alone in the Mediterranean and not any big concessions was made to).
Posted by Jacob AG
The circumstances are very different, especially in that Israel is an American ally, but I find it plausible that the U.S. would appease Israel to such an extent that Israel gets into a hot war and the U.S. intervenes.
- Oriente Medio: Revisitando Os 14 Pontos De Woodrow Wilson - David Ignatius (wp)
Rethinking Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points David Ignatius The Washington Post, 9/07/2014 As U.S. policymakers ponder the future shape of the Middle East, they should perhaps recall that the United States was opposed to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, the...
- The Evidence On Globalisation - Niklas Potrafke
Um bom amigo, e grande pesquisador dos temas econômicos globais, e das políticas comerciais em geral, Rogerio Farias, me envia não apenas o link mas este trabalho completo: The Evidence on GlobalisationNiklas Potrafke *The World Economy (2014) doi:...
- Israelis, Saudis And The Iranian Agreement - George Friedman (stratfor)
Geopolitical WeeklyIsraelis, Saudis and the Iranian AgreementBy George FriedmanStratfor, Tuesday, November 26, 2013 A deal between Iran and the P-5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) was reached Saturday night. The...
- Diplomacia Brasileira: Um Balanco Para A Foreign Policy
The Soft-Power Power Susan Glasser, Foreign Policy's editor in chief, met Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in Brasilia for a wide-ranging conversation on Brazil's role as the rest rises. Below, the edited excerpts. INTERVIEW BY SUSAN GLASSER | DECEMBER...
Carl
Chamberlain’s decision was a result of two main factors: First, UK was not willing to fight against Germany, but rather maintain a status quo of competing and antagonist states in mainland Europe, namely France, Germany and USSR. Since in the middle, Germany needed to be stronger to balance the power of the other historically enemies of Britain (in political, economical, historic, or ideological terms). And there was the belief that Germany would contain and oppose communism and protect West from the East.
Second, UK was not prepared to fight an inland war with Germany. The population was not willing, neither the army was as strong. Also, economic benefits of a peaceful Europe must have had some rule.
In the today globalized world, none of the two countries fulfills all of those characteristic: Iran is not in the position Germany was in terms of military and economic power compared to that of USA, but can be used as a tool of keeping the balances of Middle East in check (as long as it does not have nuclear armament and the present Syrian regime falls) and China is in almost the same, military, economic and political position as Germany was, but is cannot be used as a tool for keeping balances in east Asia, since it tends to disrupt it by gaining more power on itself. The social and economic factors play a bigger role in the case of China than that of Iran. for those reasons I believe that there is a bigger chance that USA refrains/limits itself more towards China than towards Iran. Although there is a bigger chance for China to act more aggressively against US interests after such a limitation than Iran, considering its economic, military, territorial and demographic might. Even though Iran tends to be more aggressive I don’t think it has any of the tools needed to directly oppose US, but is just trying to gain the leading role in the Middle East, strongly in question now. I’d think of Iran more as the Italy of WWII (was never going to fight UK alone in the Mediterranean and not any big concessions was made to).