Diplomacia e Relações Internacionais
Conclusões devastadoras do economista John Taylor, autor da famosa "Taylor Rule" -- procurem saber o que é isso, no Google, vocês vão gostar -- e ex-Secretário de Assuntos Internacionais do Tesouro dos EUA, em seu depoimento ao Congresso (Senate Committee on Banking...), em 17 de março, sobre os resultados decepcionantes, e até profundamente negativos, do TARP, ou seja, o programa oficial do Tesouro para salvar os grandes bancos (considerados "too big to fail"), na sequência da crise financeira de 2008-2009.
Transcrevo apenas partes de seu depoimento (que pode ser lido na íntegra aqui):
(...)
Recall that the original idea of TARP, upon which the TARP was sold, was to relieve certain financial institutions of their troubled assets by buying the assets from the institutions. Few understood how this idea would work—how the price would be determined for example—which added to the uncertainty. This original idea was changed after the TARP was enacted and the government announced that it would simply inject capital into the banks.
(...)
It should also be noted that many of those economists who view the TARP as having a beneficial effect argue that there were much better alternatives that could have avoided the financial panic and would have been far less costly with fewer long-term side effects.
(...)
In my view the TARP was not effective in stabilizing the financial system, especially if one takes into account the panic caused by its chaotic rollout and the fact that other actions could have been taken. Indeed other actions were taken, including the Fed’s support for the commercial paper market and money market mutual funds, and I believe these were effective in mitigating the panic, which evidence shows was in part caused by the TARP.
(...)
Legacy Costs
Although disagreement remains about whether TARP was destabilizing or stabilizing in the short run, there is very little disagreement about the longer-run legacy costs which are substantial, long-lasting, and already being felt.
In January [2011] the Special Investigator General of the TARP listed these costs:9
- “damage to Government credibility that has plagued the program,”
- “failure of programs designed to help Main Street rather than Wall Street,”
- “moral hazard and potentially disastrous consequences associated with the continued
existence of financial institutions that are ‘too big to fail’”
(...)
And just yesterday [March 16, 2011] the Congressional Oversight Panel released its final report listing these additional effects of TARP:
- “continuing distortions in the market”
- “public anger toward policymakers,”
- “a lack of full transparency and accountability.”
To these I would add that the TARP established an unfortunate precedent of heavy government intervention in the operations of private businesses along with the use of a great deal of power.
(...)
Most of these legacy costs will be a drag on the U.S. financial system and economy for years to come unless the precedents are reversed, perhaps through legislation. Some argue that the costs of TARP are small because estimates show that the government will lose less money than budget experts originally thought. But government programs can cause much harm to the economy and to people even if they raise revenue. For example, inflation is enormously costly to society even though it is a source of revenue to the government.
Conclusion
In sum, in my view there is no convincing evidence to support the view that the TARP had a stabilizing effect on the financial markets or the U.S. economy. On the contrary there is evidence that the chaotic rollout of the TARP exacerbated the crisis. Even if one can find some stabilizing effects, it is clear that other actions could have been taken that did not have these rollout costs. Finally, there is a considerable consensus among economists that the legacy costs of TARP are large, especially the perpetuation and amplification of the destabilizing “too big to fail” problem in our financial system caused by the expectations of more bailouts in the future.
===========
Aos que desejarem ler mais sobre John Taylor e seus trabalhos acadêmicos, recomendo uma visita ao seu blog: http://johnbtaylorsblog.blogspot.com/
Não é preciso lembrar que o governo brasileiro pratica TARPs a torto e a direito, entregando dinheiro alegremente a quem já é rico -- Eike Batista acaba de levar 800 milhões do BNDES --, concedendo mais de 250 bilhões ao BNDES para este entregar aos industriais amigos a 6% e outras benesses do gênero.
Nós somos os salvadores contumazes do capitalismo tupiniquim, com TARP ou sem TARP...
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Diplomacia e Relações Internacionais
Salvando os bancos e enterrando a economia (americana, por enquanto...)
Conclusões devastadoras do economista John Taylor, autor da famosa "Taylor Rule" -- procurem saber o que é isso, no Google, vocês vão gostar -- e ex-Secretário de Assuntos Internacionais do Tesouro dos EUA, em seu depoimento ao Congresso (Senate Committee on Banking...), em 17 de março, sobre os resultados decepcionantes, e até profundamente negativos, do TARP, ou seja, o programa oficial do Tesouro para salvar os grandes bancos (considerados "too big to fail"), na sequência da crise financeira de 2008-2009.
Transcrevo apenas partes de seu depoimento (que pode ser lido na íntegra aqui):
(...)
Recall that the original idea of TARP, upon which the TARP was sold, was to relieve certain financial institutions of their troubled assets by buying the assets from the institutions. Few understood how this idea would work—how the price would be determined for example—which added to the uncertainty. This original idea was changed after the TARP was enacted and the government announced that it would simply inject capital into the banks.
(...)
It should also be noted that many of those economists who view the TARP as having a beneficial effect argue that there were much better alternatives that could have avoided the financial panic and would have been far less costly with fewer long-term side effects.
(...)
In my view the TARP was not effective in stabilizing the financial system, especially if one takes into account the panic caused by its chaotic rollout and the fact that other actions could have been taken. Indeed other actions were taken, including the Fed’s support for the commercial paper market and money market mutual funds, and I believe these were effective in mitigating the panic, which evidence shows was in part caused by the TARP.
(...)
Legacy Costs
Although disagreement remains about whether TARP was destabilizing or stabilizing in the short run, there is very little disagreement about the longer-run legacy costs which are substantial, long-lasting, and already being felt.
In January [2011] the Special Investigator General of the TARP listed these costs:9
- “damage to Government credibility that has plagued the program,”
- “failure of programs designed to help Main Street rather than Wall Street,”
- “moral hazard and potentially disastrous consequences associated with the continued
existence of financial institutions that are ‘too big to fail’”
(...)
And just yesterday [March 16, 2011] the Congressional Oversight Panel released its final report listing these additional effects of TARP:
- “continuing distortions in the market”
- “public anger toward policymakers,”
- “a lack of full transparency and accountability.”
To these I would add that the TARP established an unfortunate precedent of heavy government intervention in the operations of private businesses along with the use of a great deal of power.
(...)
Most of these legacy costs will be a drag on the U.S. financial system and economy for years to come unless the precedents are reversed, perhaps through legislation. Some argue that the costs of TARP are small because estimates show that the government will lose less money than budget experts originally thought. But government programs can cause much harm to the economy and to people even if they raise revenue. For example, inflation is enormously costly to society even though it is a source of revenue to the government.
Conclusion
In sum, in my view there is no convincing evidence to support the view that the TARP had a stabilizing effect on the financial markets or the U.S. economy. On the contrary there is evidence that the chaotic rollout of the TARP exacerbated the crisis. Even if one can find some stabilizing effects, it is clear that other actions could have been taken that did not have these rollout costs. Finally, there is a considerable consensus among economists that the legacy costs of TARP are large, especially the perpetuation and amplification of the destabilizing “too big to fail” problem in our financial system caused by the expectations of more bailouts in the future.
===========
Aos que desejarem ler mais sobre John Taylor e seus trabalhos acadêmicos, recomendo uma visita ao seu blog: http://johnbtaylorsblog.blogspot.com/
Não é preciso lembrar que o governo brasileiro pratica TARPs a torto e a direito, entregando dinheiro alegremente a quem já é rico -- Eike Batista acaba de levar 800 milhões do BNDES --, concedendo mais de 250 bilhões ao BNDES para este entregar aos industriais amigos a 6% e outras benesses do gênero.
Nós somos os salvadores contumazes do capitalismo tupiniquim, com TARP ou sem TARP...
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- Deutsche Bank Analisa As Perspectivas Economicas Globais (2013)
Um excelente relatório analítico de conjuntura, e também de exame das crises financeiras em perspectiva global, comparada e histórica, por parte de economistas do Deutsche Bank. Agradeço ao meu amigo André Eiras ter me chamado a atenção para este...
- Banqueiros Dancam Enquanto Tem Musica (ou Ate A Crise Chegar) - Book Review (nyt)
Cause(s) and Effect(s) ‘After the Music Stopped,’ by Alan S. Blinder By MATTHEW BISHOP The New York Times Review of Books, March 1, 2013 AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead By Alan S. Blinder 476 pp. The...
- Crise Internacional: Cinco Anos - Otaviano Canuto
Goodbye Financial Engineers, Hello Political Wonks Otaviano Canuto, Vice-President, Poverty Reduction, World BankHuff Post, August 11, 2012This week marks the fifth anniversary of the global financial crisis. Five years ago, the world of finance was...
- Arthur Laffer Vs Governos Keynesianos: Uma Opiniao Sensata
Arthur Laffer: The Real 'Stimulus' RecordIn country after country, increased government spending acted more like a depressant than a stimulant.By ARTHUR B. LAFFERThe Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2012Policy makers in Washington and other...
- Occupy Wall Street Gets Wrong - Foreign Affairs
What Occupy Wall Street Gets Wrong About Inequality Douglas Holtz-Eakin Foreign Affairs, October 24, 2011 The protestors taking part in the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations around the country, despite their disparate backgrounds, seem to have settled...