Diplomacia e Relações Internacionais
Recentemente fui contatado por um ex-funcionário de uma organização internacional, a quem conheci justamente em função de meu trabalho profissional junto a essa organização nos temas da agenda internacional que à época -- digamos, uns dez anos atrás -- ocupavam-me institucionalmente em nome do Brasil.
Não vem ao caso, agora, detalhar quem, qual, onde, como, pois o referido ex-funcionário, um amigo pessoal, contatou-me em sua nova qualidade de consultor privado em "temas globais" e gostaria de ter sugestões de nomes brasileiros para participar de um evento que trataria exatamente dos temas que figuram no título deste post. Indiquei vários nomes e não perguntei se foram ou não contatados diretamente.
Em todo caso, ele mandou-me o documento de planejamento desse evento, feito em colaboração entre essa organização internacional (sempre acho que eles gastam dinheiro com "palavras soltas") e uma fundação privada (como sempre é de tradição nos países latinos, sustentada com recursos públicos, em grande medida), e solicitou meu posicionamento sobre os temas enfocados.
Como estava em forma de perguntas, foi-me fácil reagir (ainda que muito rapidamente, e sem maiores elaborações) às questões colocadas.
Esta é a origem do texto que segue abaixo, primeiro em sua versão completa (ainda que provisória), depois, num segundo post, em sua versão curta, como "outline" de uma página.
Como esse texto não será aproveitado, a não ser para compor um novo texto, mais curto, de 3 páginas apenas, sobre os mesmos temas, permito-me reproduzi-lo aqui, tão somente como um "registro" de reações minhas a questões colocadas por outros.
Se eu estivesse escrevendo ab initio um texto meu, faria de outra forma, claro, pois o que vai abaixo são apenas reações a questões colocadas externamente.
O que está em itálico são as perguntas colocadas no documento de planejamento do evento em questão, sem a parte de elaboração a respeito delas, pois isto tornaria muito extenso um texto (meu), que já tem seis páginas.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida (7.10.2010)
Global Governance and Institutional Reform: a personal view
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
[(dados de expediente, suprimidos)]
1) What are the lessons to be drawn from the crisis and the structural changes in the world economy?
There are small and big lessons to be drawn from the present crisis. I will start with the small ones.
I’m not among those who proclaim that the current financial crisis was created by the deregulation of the financial markets, although low regulation can indeed have facilitated the expansion of already existing bubbles in some markets. The main culprit for the bubble, though, is the low level of interest rates established by central banks during too long a period. In fact, in the same manner, but in very different ways, that the old Lords of Finance created the crisis of the 1930s, by their action and inaction, the present crisis is the result of misguided policies by the new Lords of Finance, to use the title of Liaquat Ahamed book. If one apply the “Taylor rule” to the interest rates settled by the Fed from 2002 to 2005, the diagnostics could not be more incriminating of the insouciance of the Fed with the mounting bubble.
So, the first small lesson to be drawn from the crisis, in terms of its impact in the world economy, is that in a so integrated a world, especially in the financial sector, central banks are not allowed any more to deviate from the economic fundamentals set by the markets, in which interest rates play a crucial role. Interest rates too far apart from normal market rates are prone to stimulate bubbles and disequilibria. But that was already very well known.
A second lesson, to be drawn from institutional arrangements after the crisis – in the financial G-20, for instance –, is that coordination of macroeconomic policies among major actors, even among blocs, such as European Union, is an almost pipe dream, almost a pious desire. At least, the European Commission will start to have a right to look over the fiscal plans and budgetary proposals of its member countries, which is an indispensable move on the way to have a real common currency. But all that is the “business as usual” of the aftermath of “normal” crises.
And, what are the big lessons to be drawn from this crisis?
We are not at all in a post-major crisis arrangement, a sort of diplomatic complete reordering of the world after a cataclysmic seism, touching all and every major actor of the international scene. We are very far from that.
We are not in Wesphalia-1648. We are not in Vienna-1815. We are not in Paris or Versailles-1919. And we are not in Bretton-Woods-1944, or San Francisco-1945. We are not in any major re-founding of the international economic order.
We simply are, nowadays, in the middle of our 1930s, trying to manage a big crisis by national responses, each one fitted to the specific circumstances of each country, and delinked from a major disaster affecting everyone and all countries.
To be more precise, we are somewhere between 1931 and 1933, still in the middle of a recession, but not yet in a depression. Sure, a bad thing is the level of unemployment in the world’s major economy, not as high as in 1933, but still unacceptably higher for our welfare state social patterns of our days. World trade and financial flows are not as disrupted as in the 1930s, but economic liberalization has regressed in the world, as revealed in 2010 report on Economic Freedom in the World, of the Cato Institute. This is the old protectionism, déjà vu all over again.
There are no structural changes in the world economy derived from the current crisis. The structural changes were already on the move since the 1980s, at least, when socialism started to fail and went completely down the drain. At the same time, developing countries ceased to implement national, inward-looking, projects for national development and started to open to foreign direct investments. Since then, the world economy has been transformed irrevocably, suffice is to point to the case of China becoming the second major economic power in the world.
But not everything, of course, has changed. The major decision-making institutions that are supposed to lead countries in their mutual relationships are still the same, with their same division of voting rights. IMF and World Bank are in the middle of their travails to find a new distribution of quotas. The collective voting power of China, India and Brazil is 20% less than that of Belgium, Netherlands and Italy, despite the fact that their GDP is four times greater the size of the European counterparts, and they have a population 29 times greater.
2) What are the concepts, strategies and institutional features for managing the world economy?
To manage the world economy is a pretension that even the G-7 never reached to attain in its glorious days. It is a fact that developed countries, and among them the big seven economies, controlled a respectable proportion of the world’s GDP, trade and financial flows, together with technological innovation and mass-market cultural products. But they were never capable of coordinating their macroeconomic policies among themselves; never mind establishing rules and goals for the rest of the world.
But, they settled the framework for acceptable arrangements regarding the most important matters whenever there was a need to act, such as in the big monetary turmoil of the 1970s and the 1980s. Short of agreeing on new standards for the world monetary system, they managed at least to have ad hoc arrangements to avoid too many ups and downs in the currency and exchange markets.
Nowadays, with a painful free-fall in advanced economies, it is difficult to see what could be done to restore growth rates from their stagnating levels. Besides the cyclical problems affecting major economies, with the exception of China, we still have global challenges ahead, like poverty in less developed countries, decisions to be made regarding environmental matters, human rights violations in non-democratic countries, and many other relevant issues like those.
One single strategy would be the establishing of just one big goal for the world community: that has to be the promotion of global development, not exactly through assistance (the traditional Official Development Assistance), but primarily through real trade liberalization, especially in the farm sector, the only real possibility for the less-developed countries to become integrated into the world economy. The United States and European Union have a main responsibility in this domain.
3) Main existing institutional challenges for intelligent regulation and better governance.
It is difficult to see any credible solution for the impasse in the Doha Round coming out from current G-7/G-8. But it is also unlikely that consensual proposals could be arising from such a large body as the financial G20, too heterogeneous to reach common positions. Perhaps, the best hope would be an evolution from the current G-8 to a new G-13. That means joining the leaders of the G-8 together with the 5 “outreach” countries, namely Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.
Experience shows that informal bodies are more likely to deliver something meaningful than large institutionalized groups that get involved in bureaucratic foot-dragging and political entanglements. The biggest problem in this approach is acquiring the legitimacy that involves the act of speaking for the whole world community from the starting point of only 13 countries. To solve this quandary implies that the political leaders of these 13 countries would have to find a terrain of reciprocal confidence between them that has to be compatible with the representation at large they would be pretending to have from the whole community of nations.
4) How can interaction between established international bodies be improved, and public and private interests better aligned?
That’s is a hard task to achieve. I don’t think it is possible, or feasible, to have a perfect coordination of agendas between international bodies and multilateral organizations. The world is simply not as globalized as required to attain this kind of interaction. Disparities of interests, differences of levels of development, huge imbalances between countries and regions, many factors collude to render almost impossible this exercise of coordination.
A more modest approach could be a more frequent interaction – once a year – between the leaders of the new G-13. Sherpas could then be mobilized to discuss trade matters, environmental affairs, human rights protection, UN peace-keeping missions and the like, with specific mandates from their political leaders.
5) There is such a thing as international governance; can it be implemented?
Plainly not, but there are attempts into this direction. Don’t look at the UN for that, but we should work with the three main agencies for globalization: IMF, World Bank and the WTO. Some organizational work should be implemented, with institutional changes here and there, and their agendas should be made compatible with consensual decisions reached through the new G13. To start with, Europeans, that is, the EU, should have permanent, but rotating, seats among them, opening the way for more decisional power in favor of emerging powers.
The main focus here is on international economic coordination around relevant issues for the global community. A possible suggestion would be to try to establish a “global new deal”, exchanging extensive protection to investments and proprietary riches (patents and the like) and other governance (microeconomic) conditions for productive activity, by developing countries or recipients of FDI, against extensive licensing and effective investments and trade liberalization by rich countries and investors alike; this would imply an extension and the strengthening of trade, investment and intellectual property rights treaties, giving a little boost to globalization.
Traditional assistance for development, because ineffective, should be essentially replaced by a focus on educational improvements, that is, a focused program for human resources qualification. Assistance as such should be limited to the implementation of a consistent program for eradicating most of infectious diseases in African countries and in some other developing countries. The main reason for the persistence of poverty in those countries is not the lack of resources, but the absence of governance and their non-integration into the world economy through trade links, not financial aid.
Assuming that the questions of democratic governance and human rights protection can be a conundrum four countries like China, or perhaps even Russia, the main target for the agenda of the new G13 could be the adoption of high standards for public governance in the technical meaning of this expression. It is a little too early to make democratic governance and respect for the human rights the decisive criteria for bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation. But these should be the ultimate goals of any kind of global governance.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Professor of International Political Economy at the Post-Graduate Program in Law of the University Center of Brasilia (Uniceub).
[Shanghai, October 26, 2010]
- Livro: Matthias Herdegen: Principles Of International Economic Law (oup, 2013)
Um livro indispensável, para oa estudiosos das relações econômicas internacionais.Paulo Roberto de Almeida Principles of International Economic LawHerdegen, Matthias Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2013. Principles of International...
- Uma Suposta Guerra Cambial Para O Nytimes
Ate o New York Times caiu nessa esparrela da guerra cambial... PRA EDITORIAL Preventing a Currency War New York Times: February 13, 2013 The Group of 7 industrialized countries appeared to tamp down talk of a currency war in a statement this week that...
- Paises Em Desenvolvimento Na Economia Global - Livro De O. Canuto (banco Mundial)
Meu amigo dileto, Otaviano Canuto, ex-professor do curso de RI da USP, atualmente vice-presidente do Banco Mundial para assuntos de economias em desenvolvimento anuncia a publicação de seu livro, como abaixo: Developing Countries Come to the Global...
- An Economic Cold War -- Artigo Pra Publicado
Meu mais recente artigo publicado: “Now, an Economic Cold War: Old Realities, New Prospects” (Shanghai, 13 outubro 2010, 4 p.) Resumo modificado de trabalho apresentado na Fundación Ramón Areces, de Madrid, em simpósio organizado em colaboração...
- Governanca Global E Reformas Institucionais (2): Uma Sintese De Minhas Respostas
Transcrevo agora, no imediato seguimento do post anterior (ver abaixo) sobre o mesmo tema, um resumo de uma página tratando dos mesmos temas colocados num documento de planejamento de um encontro sobre o assunto, que recebi para comentário pessoal....
Diplomacia e Relações Internacionais
Governanca global e reformas institucionais (1): minhas respostas a perguntas
Recentemente fui contatado por um ex-funcionário de uma organização internacional, a quem conheci justamente em função de meu trabalho profissional junto a essa organização nos temas da agenda internacional que à época -- digamos, uns dez anos atrás -- ocupavam-me institucionalmente em nome do Brasil.
Não vem ao caso, agora, detalhar quem, qual, onde, como, pois o referido ex-funcionário, um amigo pessoal, contatou-me em sua nova qualidade de consultor privado em "temas globais" e gostaria de ter sugestões de nomes brasileiros para participar de um evento que trataria exatamente dos temas que figuram no título deste post. Indiquei vários nomes e não perguntei se foram ou não contatados diretamente.
Em todo caso, ele mandou-me o documento de planejamento desse evento, feito em colaboração entre essa organização internacional (sempre acho que eles gastam dinheiro com "palavras soltas") e uma fundação privada (como sempre é de tradição nos países latinos, sustentada com recursos públicos, em grande medida), e solicitou meu posicionamento sobre os temas enfocados.
Como estava em forma de perguntas, foi-me fácil reagir (ainda que muito rapidamente, e sem maiores elaborações) às questões colocadas.
Esta é a origem do texto que segue abaixo, primeiro em sua versão completa (ainda que provisória), depois, num segundo post, em sua versão curta, como "outline" de uma página.
Como esse texto não será aproveitado, a não ser para compor um novo texto, mais curto, de 3 páginas apenas, sobre os mesmos temas, permito-me reproduzi-lo aqui, tão somente como um "registro" de reações minhas a questões colocadas por outros.
Se eu estivesse escrevendo ab initio um texto meu, faria de outra forma, claro, pois o que vai abaixo são apenas reações a questões colocadas externamente.
O que está em itálico são as perguntas colocadas no documento de planejamento do evento em questão, sem a parte de elaboração a respeito delas, pois isto tornaria muito extenso um texto (meu), que já tem seis páginas.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida (7.10.2010)
Global Governance and Institutional Reform: a personal view
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
[(dados de expediente, suprimidos)]
1) What are the lessons to be drawn from the crisis and the structural changes in the world economy?
There are small and big lessons to be drawn from the present crisis. I will start with the small ones.
I’m not among those who proclaim that the current financial crisis was created by the deregulation of the financial markets, although low regulation can indeed have facilitated the expansion of already existing bubbles in some markets. The main culprit for the bubble, though, is the low level of interest rates established by central banks during too long a period. In fact, in the same manner, but in very different ways, that the old Lords of Finance created the crisis of the 1930s, by their action and inaction, the present crisis is the result of misguided policies by the new Lords of Finance, to use the title of Liaquat Ahamed book. If one apply the “Taylor rule” to the interest rates settled by the Fed from 2002 to 2005, the diagnostics could not be more incriminating of the insouciance of the Fed with the mounting bubble.
So, the first small lesson to be drawn from the crisis, in terms of its impact in the world economy, is that in a so integrated a world, especially in the financial sector, central banks are not allowed any more to deviate from the economic fundamentals set by the markets, in which interest rates play a crucial role. Interest rates too far apart from normal market rates are prone to stimulate bubbles and disequilibria. But that was already very well known.
A second lesson, to be drawn from institutional arrangements after the crisis – in the financial G-20, for instance –, is that coordination of macroeconomic policies among major actors, even among blocs, such as European Union, is an almost pipe dream, almost a pious desire. At least, the European Commission will start to have a right to look over the fiscal plans and budgetary proposals of its member countries, which is an indispensable move on the way to have a real common currency. But all that is the “business as usual” of the aftermath of “normal” crises.
And, what are the big lessons to be drawn from this crisis?
We are not at all in a post-major crisis arrangement, a sort of diplomatic complete reordering of the world after a cataclysmic seism, touching all and every major actor of the international scene. We are very far from that.
We are not in Wesphalia-1648. We are not in Vienna-1815. We are not in Paris or Versailles-1919. And we are not in Bretton-Woods-1944, or San Francisco-1945. We are not in any major re-founding of the international economic order.
We simply are, nowadays, in the middle of our 1930s, trying to manage a big crisis by national responses, each one fitted to the specific circumstances of each country, and delinked from a major disaster affecting everyone and all countries.
To be more precise, we are somewhere between 1931 and 1933, still in the middle of a recession, but not yet in a depression. Sure, a bad thing is the level of unemployment in the world’s major economy, not as high as in 1933, but still unacceptably higher for our welfare state social patterns of our days. World trade and financial flows are not as disrupted as in the 1930s, but economic liberalization has regressed in the world, as revealed in 2010 report on Economic Freedom in the World, of the Cato Institute. This is the old protectionism, déjà vu all over again.
There are no structural changes in the world economy derived from the current crisis. The structural changes were already on the move since the 1980s, at least, when socialism started to fail and went completely down the drain. At the same time, developing countries ceased to implement national, inward-looking, projects for national development and started to open to foreign direct investments. Since then, the world economy has been transformed irrevocably, suffice is to point to the case of China becoming the second major economic power in the world.
But not everything, of course, has changed. The major decision-making institutions that are supposed to lead countries in their mutual relationships are still the same, with their same division of voting rights. IMF and World Bank are in the middle of their travails to find a new distribution of quotas. The collective voting power of China, India and Brazil is 20% less than that of Belgium, Netherlands and Italy, despite the fact that their GDP is four times greater the size of the European counterparts, and they have a population 29 times greater.
2) What are the concepts, strategies and institutional features for managing the world economy?
To manage the world economy is a pretension that even the G-7 never reached to attain in its glorious days. It is a fact that developed countries, and among them the big seven economies, controlled a respectable proportion of the world’s GDP, trade and financial flows, together with technological innovation and mass-market cultural products. But they were never capable of coordinating their macroeconomic policies among themselves; never mind establishing rules and goals for the rest of the world.
But, they settled the framework for acceptable arrangements regarding the most important matters whenever there was a need to act, such as in the big monetary turmoil of the 1970s and the 1980s. Short of agreeing on new standards for the world monetary system, they managed at least to have ad hoc arrangements to avoid too many ups and downs in the currency and exchange markets.
Nowadays, with a painful free-fall in advanced economies, it is difficult to see what could be done to restore growth rates from their stagnating levels. Besides the cyclical problems affecting major economies, with the exception of China, we still have global challenges ahead, like poverty in less developed countries, decisions to be made regarding environmental matters, human rights violations in non-democratic countries, and many other relevant issues like those.
One single strategy would be the establishing of just one big goal for the world community: that has to be the promotion of global development, not exactly through assistance (the traditional Official Development Assistance), but primarily through real trade liberalization, especially in the farm sector, the only real possibility for the less-developed countries to become integrated into the world economy. The United States and European Union have a main responsibility in this domain.
3) Main existing institutional challenges for intelligent regulation and better governance.
It is difficult to see any credible solution for the impasse in the Doha Round coming out from current G-7/G-8. But it is also unlikely that consensual proposals could be arising from such a large body as the financial G20, too heterogeneous to reach common positions. Perhaps, the best hope would be an evolution from the current G-8 to a new G-13. That means joining the leaders of the G-8 together with the 5 “outreach” countries, namely Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.
Experience shows that informal bodies are more likely to deliver something meaningful than large institutionalized groups that get involved in bureaucratic foot-dragging and political entanglements. The biggest problem in this approach is acquiring the legitimacy that involves the act of speaking for the whole world community from the starting point of only 13 countries. To solve this quandary implies that the political leaders of these 13 countries would have to find a terrain of reciprocal confidence between them that has to be compatible with the representation at large they would be pretending to have from the whole community of nations.
4) How can interaction between established international bodies be improved, and public and private interests better aligned?
That’s is a hard task to achieve. I don’t think it is possible, or feasible, to have a perfect coordination of agendas between international bodies and multilateral organizations. The world is simply not as globalized as required to attain this kind of interaction. Disparities of interests, differences of levels of development, huge imbalances between countries and regions, many factors collude to render almost impossible this exercise of coordination.
A more modest approach could be a more frequent interaction – once a year – between the leaders of the new G-13. Sherpas could then be mobilized to discuss trade matters, environmental affairs, human rights protection, UN peace-keeping missions and the like, with specific mandates from their political leaders.
5) There is such a thing as international governance; can it be implemented?
Plainly not, but there are attempts into this direction. Don’t look at the UN for that, but we should work with the three main agencies for globalization: IMF, World Bank and the WTO. Some organizational work should be implemented, with institutional changes here and there, and their agendas should be made compatible with consensual decisions reached through the new G13. To start with, Europeans, that is, the EU, should have permanent, but rotating, seats among them, opening the way for more decisional power in favor of emerging powers.
The main focus here is on international economic coordination around relevant issues for the global community. A possible suggestion would be to try to establish a “global new deal”, exchanging extensive protection to investments and proprietary riches (patents and the like) and other governance (microeconomic) conditions for productive activity, by developing countries or recipients of FDI, against extensive licensing and effective investments and trade liberalization by rich countries and investors alike; this would imply an extension and the strengthening of trade, investment and intellectual property rights treaties, giving a little boost to globalization.
Traditional assistance for development, because ineffective, should be essentially replaced by a focus on educational improvements, that is, a focused program for human resources qualification. Assistance as such should be limited to the implementation of a consistent program for eradicating most of infectious diseases in African countries and in some other developing countries. The main reason for the persistence of poverty in those countries is not the lack of resources, but the absence of governance and their non-integration into the world economy through trade links, not financial aid.
Assuming that the questions of democratic governance and human rights protection can be a conundrum four countries like China, or perhaps even Russia, the main target for the agenda of the new G13 could be the adoption of high standards for public governance in the technical meaning of this expression. It is a little too early to make democratic governance and respect for the human rights the decisive criteria for bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation. But these should be the ultimate goals of any kind of global governance.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Professor of International Political Economy at the Post-Graduate Program in Law of the University Center of Brasilia (Uniceub).
[Shanghai, October 26, 2010]
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- Livro: Matthias Herdegen: Principles Of International Economic Law (oup, 2013)
Um livro indispensável, para oa estudiosos das relações econômicas internacionais.Paulo Roberto de Almeida Principles of International Economic LawHerdegen, Matthias Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2013. Principles of International...
- Uma Suposta Guerra Cambial Para O Nytimes
Ate o New York Times caiu nessa esparrela da guerra cambial... PRA EDITORIAL Preventing a Currency War New York Times: February 13, 2013 The Group of 7 industrialized countries appeared to tamp down talk of a currency war in a statement this week that...
- Paises Em Desenvolvimento Na Economia Global - Livro De O. Canuto (banco Mundial)
Meu amigo dileto, Otaviano Canuto, ex-professor do curso de RI da USP, atualmente vice-presidente do Banco Mundial para assuntos de economias em desenvolvimento anuncia a publicação de seu livro, como abaixo: Developing Countries Come to the Global...
- An Economic Cold War -- Artigo Pra Publicado
Meu mais recente artigo publicado: “Now, an Economic Cold War: Old Realities, New Prospects” (Shanghai, 13 outubro 2010, 4 p.) Resumo modificado de trabalho apresentado na Fundación Ramón Areces, de Madrid, em simpósio organizado em colaboração...
- Governanca Global E Reformas Institucionais (2): Uma Sintese De Minhas Respostas
Transcrevo agora, no imediato seguimento do post anterior (ver abaixo) sobre o mesmo tema, um resumo de uma página tratando dos mesmos temas colocados num documento de planejamento de um encontro sobre o assunto, que recebi para comentário pessoal....